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During the recent global outbreak of severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS), thousands of patients received
treatments such as ribavirin and corticosteroids. Despite
this, no controlled clinical trials assessing the efficacy of
these agents were conducted. If a second global SARS
outbreak occurred, clinicians would not have controlled
data on which to base therapeutic decisions. We discuss
the unique methodologic and logistical challenges faced by
researchers who attempt to conduct controlled trials of ther-
apeutic agents during an outbreak of a novel or unknown
infectious pathogen. We draw upon our own experience in
attempting to conduct a randomized controlled trial of rib-
avirin therapy for SARS and discuss the lessons learned.
Strategies to facilitate future clinical trials during outbreaks
of unknown or novel pathogens are also presented.
T
he recognition of SARS as a transmissible disease
prompted international efforts to identify its cause and
control its spread. The success of these efforts has been
dramatic, with the identification of the SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and the control of SARS out-
breaks in all affected countries (1–4). An evidence-based
approach to managing SARS is still lacking, however, as
no controlled clinical data are available to justify any of
the treatments used. If SARS reemerges, clinicians will
have little evidence on which to base treatment decisions.
Could clinical trials have been conducted during the glob-
al outbreak? If so, what steps need to be taken to ensure
that such trials are implemented appropriately the next
time a similar event occurs?
We highlight the challenges faced by researchers
attempting to conduct clinical trials of therapeutic agents
during an outbreak caused by an unknown or novel
pathogen. We focus the discussion on the design and
implementation of randomized controlled trials of candi-
date therapeutic agents, as such trials are the standard on
which therapeutic decision-making should be based.
Examples from our own experience attempting to launch a
randomized trial of ribavirin therapy for SARS will illus-
trate these challenges.
Formulating the Research Question
The first step in conducting a clinical trial is to develop
a simple, testable hypothesis. The challenge facing
researchers at the beginning of an outbreak caused by an
unknown or novel pathogen is selecting a hypothesis in the
face of scarce but rapidly evolving information. Once a
hypothesis is selected and a trial started, new information
arising during the outbreak may undermine the study
hypothesis before the trial is completed.  
In the initial phases of the SARS outbreak, empiric
therapy was used to provide coverage against a broad dif-
ferential of bacterial and viral pathogens. Ribavirin was
included for coverage of a presumptive viral illness, given
its in vitro activity against a variety of RNA and DNA
viruses (5). As data on pathogenesis accrued, a hypothesis
suggesting that lung injury may be immune mediated led
to widespread use of corticosteroids in combination with
ribavirin (6,7). Finally, isolation of SARS-CoV allowed
for in vitro susceptibility studies that, in combination with
increasing reports of toxicity attributed to ribavirin, result-
ed in discontinuation of ribavirin as a treatment for SARS
in Toronto, although not in all affected areas (8,9). 
Presently, a randomized trial of corticosteroids appears
to be a rational direction for future treatment trials, given
their widespread use in the treatment of SARS, despite
minimal supportive evidence, and their potential risks.
Early in the outbreak, however, we focused our attention
on designing a trial to evaluate the efficacy of ribavirin,
which was being used in Canada and Hong Kong and had
been associated with clinical successes in uncontrolled
reports (10,11). We believed that conducting such a trial
was important, given the widespread use of ribavirin and
its potential risks and benefits. Subsequently, reports of
adverse events associated with its use, demonstrated lack
of in vitro activity, and reports of clinical progression on
therapy convinced Canadian clinicians to discontinue its
use without further study (8,9,12). At this point, we do not
feel that a randomized trial of ribavirin therapy is
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been valuable, given the continued use of ribavirin for the
treatment of SARS in Hong Kong and China (13).
The hypothesis selected for evaluation during an out-
break must address an important clinical question that can-
not be rapidly answered by other means. Although there
may be a temptation to launch a trial rapidly after the onset
of an outbreak, in most cases the etiologic agent should be
identified with reasonable certainty before conducting tri-
als of specific agents. Agents selected for study should
have plausible mechanisms of action, activity established
by in vitro studies, known toxicity profiles, and prelimi-
nary clinical evidence supporting their efficacy. Evidence
should not consist solely of anecdotal case reports but
should include some data derived from comparisons of
treated and untreated patients. If other means of rejecting
the hypothesis exist (i.e., in vitro studies, animal studies),
but have not yet been conducted, a trial of the agent should
be deferred and its resources allocated to trials testing
agents that cannot be evaluated by other means. For exam-
ple, the hypothesis that steroids can improve outcome in
SARS by preventing or abrogating immune-mediated lung
injury will be difficult to disprove by any means short of a
randomized controlled trial. 
If a randomized trial is not considered justified, feasi-
ble, or ethical, therapeutic agents of unknown efficacy
should not be used without attempts to systematically doc-
ument illness severity, clinical course, treatment, adverse
events, and confounding factors in a standardized manner
to facilitate analysis. At a minimum, comparisons of
cohorts of patients treated differently may yield informa-
tion that can inform subsequent trials.
Identifying the Study Population
In all clinical trials, the patient population to be includ-
ed must be precisely defined. In an outbreak involving an
unknown or novel pathogen, specific microbiologic tests
to diagnose infection will not be available. Case defini-
tions used by public health authorities to identify patients
and to limit transmission through isolation and quarantine
are deliberately broad to ensure that few contagious per-
sons are missed. As a result, the specificity of diagnosis
may be poor. Conducting a trial without a specific diagnos-
tic test may result in the inclusion of patients without the
condition of interest. These patients will receive potential-
ly toxic therapies with no possible benefit. Furthermore,
inclusion of patients without the disease of interest will
bias the study towards the null hypothesis.
The initial case definitions for SARS are examples of
this problem. Based on the World Health Organization’s
initial case definition, persons presenting with fever, respi-
ratory symptoms, and an epidemiologically defined expo-
sure are considered to have SARS (14). This definition is
non-specific, as all patients with febrile respiratory illness-
es, regardless of etiology, will be included if they have any
exposure history. This was particularly problematic in
returned travelers with respiratory illness. Because direct
SARS exposure was uncommon among travelers, even to
high-risk areas, inclusion of travel-related cases in our trial
would have resulted in a low positive predictive value for
the case definition. 
Although no simple solution to this problem exists, the
specificity of inclusion criteria may be improved by ensur-
ing that appropriate microbiologic investigations are per-
formed to exclude patients with alternative diagnoses and
by narrowing the epidemiologic case definition. For exam-
ple, in the case of SARS, limiting study inclusion to those
with pulmonary infiltrates on chest radiograph and requir-
ing that epidemiologic links be based on direct contact
with another case of SARS (which would exclude the
majority of travelers to SARS-affected regions) would
improve specificity. However, one must be careful when
specificity is increased by selecting patients with more
advanced presentations of disease because these patients
may be less likely to respond to therapy compared with
patients identified earlier in their disease. 
Finally, post-hoc analysis of trial results can be per-
formed once specific microbiologic and serologic tests
become available. This analysis will allow further assess-
ment of therapeutic efficacy. However, every effort should
be made during the trial to exclude patients with a low
probability of having the disease of interest to minimize
the likelihood of treating uninfected patients with poten-
tially toxic agents. This will minimize the number of
patients treated inappropriately and maximize the likeli-
hood of identifying differences in outcomes between the
treatment and control groups. 
Defining the Intervention
All clinical trials require that the intervention used be
defined explicitly. Dose, frequency, duration, and route of
administration must be predetermined and are usually
based on data from in vitro, animal, human safety, and
dose-finding studies. In an outbreak involving an unknown
or novel pathogen, these data will be unavailable.
Choosing an intervention will be based on analogy to the
treatment of other infectious diseases and available safety
data. Negative trial results will be open to the criticism that
a different dose or duration of therapy might have been
effective.
In Toronto, the initial dose of ribavirin used was based
on limited clinical experience with the use of high-dose
ribavirin in the treatment of hemorrhagic fever syndromes
(15). Asimilar dose was selected for our trial. Clinicians in
Toronto who treated patients with SARS observed a high
incidence of adverse effects associated with this regimen
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and ribavirin therapy was ultimately abandoned. Had our
initial trial been launched, clinicians would have been
unwilling to enroll patients, due to the high doses of rib-
avirin proposed and the emerging reports of drug toxicity. 
Ideally, interventions selected for a randomized trial
should be based on preliminary data. Outbreaks of unknown
and novel pathogens represent unique situations in which
such data will not be available. The initial use of supportive
care alone is a defendable position, particularly when mini-
mal evidence exists to support the use of any therapeutic
agent, and considerable evidence exists to support potential
harm. This approach was adopted in the United States, and
no fatal cases were reported, although only eight U.S. cases
have been serologically confirmed (4). In parts of the world
where outbreaks were larger, considerable pressure was
placed on clinicians to offer specific therapies directed
against SARS-CoV, even if such therapies were unproven
and potentially dangerous. When unproven and potentially
harmful therapeutic agents are being used in clinical prac-
tice, a simple, rapidly conducted  randomized trial may be
beneficial. Protocols will need to allow for the evolution of
clinical practice during the outbreak. Although changes in
dose or duration may make interpretation of results more
difficult, rigid adherence to initial protocols may make tri-
als unacceptable to clinicians and potentially dangerous to
patients. Such trials require ongoing communication with
trial participants and timely disclosure of emerging infor-
mation about efficacy and safety. 
Defining Study Outcomes 
All clinical research requires a clearly defined and clin-
ically relevant outcome. In an outbreak caused by an
unknown or novel pathogen, the ultimate size of the out-
break will dictate enrollment and cannot be predicted in
advance. Concerns that the trial will be underpowered are
likely to arise. To enhance feasibility, selecting more fre-
quently occurring, but less clinically relevant, outcomes
may be tempting. 
Estimates of case-fatality rates for the Toronto SARS
outbreaks varied from 30%, to 3%, to 6.5%, and then to
17% as the outbreak progressed (9,16,17). Our initial sam-
ple size calculations using mortality as the outcome were
based on a case-fatality estimate of 3% in the treatment
(ribavirin) group. Using an alpha of 0.05 and a power of
80%, the sample size required to detect a 25% reduction in
case-fatality rate from 4% in the placebo group to 3% in
the ribavirin group would be 191 patients per group. Even
if every SARS patient in Canada had been successfully
enrolled, the study would not have recruited sufficient
patients. Our solution was to use a composite outcome of
death, mechanical ventilation, or severe hypoxemia to
reduce the required sample size. 
Due to the unknown size of an outbreak, the use of
composite endpoints is a reasonable strategy to maximize
the number of observed outcomes and minimize the
required sample size, provided every component of the
composite endpoint is clinically relevant and can be meas-
ured in a standardized manner.
Challenges to Recruitment
The feasibility of conducting a controlled trial during
an outbreak is dependent on the ability to recruit sufficient
numbers of patients into the study before the outbreak
ends. In the first Toronto outbreak, SARS developed in
249 patients between the time the outbreak was recognized
on March 13, 2003, and the end of the outbreak on April
25 (Figure). The decision to conduct a trial was made on
March 23, 10 days after the recognition of the first cases of
SARS. A protocol was rapidly developed and approved by
the first local research ethics board on March 28 and by
Health Canada on March 31. Review of the epidemic
curve shows that the 18-day delay from the time the out-
break was recognized on March 13 to the receipt of expe-
dited ethics approval on March 31 resulted in loss of 149
(60%) of 249 potential patients who could otherwise have
been assessed for enrollment (Table). Cases that occurred
during the second Toronto outbreak were not considered,
as the use of ribavirin had been rejected by clinicians.
Even if the second outbreak was considered, few addition-
al case-patients could have been recruited because
increased knowledge about control strategies resulted in
reduced transmission and a smaller outbreak.
The ability to launch a trial quickly in the face of an
outbreak is dependent on the speed of protocol develop-
ment and the time required for obtaining ethics approval
and study funding. Strategies that could be developed
before the next outbreak of an unknown or novel pathogen
to facilitate the rapid initiation of trials include the estab-
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Figure. Epidemic curve of the first Toronto SARS outbreak. Data
provided courtesy of the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care,
Ontario, Canada.lishment of a collaborative multicenter research network,
the creation of a contingency fund for urgent therapeutic
trials, and the development of new processes for emer-
gency expedited ethics review. 
Value of a Collaborative Research Network
A national or international collaborative research net-
work consisting of infectious disease clinicians, microbiol-
ogists, epidemiologists, and clinical trial methodologists
should be established. The network would facilitate the
rapid initiation of trials during an outbreak through the
advanced preparation of study protocols and by providing
urgent assistance in the design and implementation of tri-
als after recognition of an outbreak. A major role of the
network would be to establish a communication system to
connect front-line clinicians and network collaborators at
multiple sites to facilitate an exchange of clinical informa-
tion. This would allow accumulated clinical experience to
be shared between sites and would provide a forum for the
discussion of patient management issues. Furthermore, it
could be used to identify and select hypotheses for evalua-
tion, determine the feasibility of studies, and recruit clini-
cians to participate in trial design and implementation. The
network would shoulder the burden of protocol develop-
ment and implementation, including liaising directly with
local or national ethics boards, thereby reducing workload
on the clinicians who will be fully occupied with clinical
responsibilities. 
Contingency Fund for Urgent Therapeutic Trials
Randomized trials are resource intensive and cannot be
initiated without financial support. Outbreaks are unpre-
dictable events that place enormous strains on healthcare
systems. To launch a trial promptly during an outbreak,
without diverting local funding away from efforts that are
crucial for outbreak control, a centralized contingency
fund for urgent clinical therapeutic trials should be estab-
lished nationally or internationally. Ideally, funding would
support an external clinical trials team capable of opera-
tionalizing the trial, as local personnel may be over-
whelmed by clinical responsibilities related to the
outbreak.
Research Ethics Boards and Ethics Approval
The need to obtain approval from research ethics
boards is another factor that may delay initiation of a trial.
This requirement is further complicated by the mobile
nature of outbreaks. Individual institutions may be affect-
ed by an outbreak for limited periods of time; the outbreak
may spread to new geographic areas and involve new insti-
tutions. Investigators may need to repeatedly submit their
protocol to new ethics boards, resulting in further delays
and missed opportunities. 
Our trial of ribavirin in SARS treatment was approved
at several university-affiliated teaching hospitals involved
in caring for patients during the first SARS outbreak in
Toronto. By the time the trial was approved and ready to
start, the outbreak appeared to be over. When a second out-
break occurred, it was centered at a hospital where ethics
approval had not been obtained. 
Several potential solutions to this problem exist. The
most fundamental would be the creation of a national or
regional emergency ethics review board with the authority
to override the need for local institutional approval and the
capability of rapidly assessing protocols when outbreaks
occur. In certain circumstances, ethics approval could be
obtained prior to an outbreak. For example, a protocol for a
trial of corticosteroids in SARS could be designed and
approved now and implemented if another outbreak occurs.
Additionally, a “rolling” type of ethics approval could be
developed, whereby portions of a trial could be approved
while other elements are modified in real time as the trial is
launched, with ongoing supervision and periodic re-
approval by the ethics board. This would allow flexibility in
refining dosing regimens and prevent rigid protocols from
being repeatedly abandoned as new information emerges. 
Risks to Healthcare Workers and Researchers
Transmissibility of pathogens is a feature unique to out-
breaks of infectious diseases and has direct implications
for conducting clinical trials. In an outbreak, both
caregivers and researchers involved in assessing and mon-
itoring patients may be placing themselves at risk. This sit-
uation is particularly true in the early stages of an outbreak
involving a novel pathogen such as SARS because the
most effective means of preventing transmission are not
yet known.  For example, SARS studies conducted in
Toronto required clinicians to obtain specimens such as
nasopharyngeal swabs in addition to those collected for
clinical purposes.  Such actions increase the potential for
both exposure to and acquisition of SARS.  
In addition to personal risk, researchers may become
vectors of disease, placing patients, colleagues, family
members, and institutions at risk. Immediately after ethics
approval was obtained for our trial, one of the trial’s pri-
mary investigators was hospitalized with SARS, and
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Table. Eligible cases lost to enrollment in a hypothetical trial of 
ribavirin during the first outbreak of SARS in Toronto. 
Date from outbreak recognition to date 
of enrollment of first patient (days) 
Number of cases lost to 
enrollment (%) 
March 13–16 (3)  6/249 (2) 
March 13–20 (7)  37/249 (15) 
March 13–23 (10)  62/249 (25) 
March 13–28 (15)
a  114/249 (46) 
March 13–31 (18)
b  149/249 (60) 
aApproval from first local ethics review board 
bApproval from Health Canada 
 several other researchers were quarantined. Although these
exposures did not result from participation in the clinical
trial, they highlight the difficulty of conducting clinical tri-
als during an outbreak, especially when researchers are
also involved in outbreak management and may be moving
between institutions. Evidence that healthcare workers
working part-time at several Toronto area hospitals trans-
mitted SARS from one institution to another led to the
public health requirement that healthcare workers be limit-
ed to a single institution. In particular, healthcare workers
at hospitals in which transmission had occurred were not
permitted to enter other hospitals. Such policies were
important in limiting the spread of the outbreak but pro-
vide additional challenges to trial implementation.
In the future, investigators and research ethics boards
will need to expand their horizons to consider the risks and
benefits of trials as they apply to participating clinicians,
researchers, and the public, as well as to the individual
patient. In some cases, increasing the potential for expo-
sure of either clinicians or researchers above what is clini-
cally mandated may be considered unethical, particularly
when novel pathogens of unknown mode of transmission
are involved. Local ethics boards may not have the experi-
ence or expertise to deal with issues of public safety; this
provides another argument for the creation of a special-
ized, national ethics board to deal with clinical trials dur-
ing outbreaks or other public health emergencies. 
Various approaches could be utilized to manage these
risks. A cautious approach to preventing transmission and
providing adequate training for participating clinicians and
researchers should be required. Integrating clinical care
and trial monitoring can reduce the number of patient vis-
its. Sharing specimens between clinical and research labo-
ratories may eliminate the need for additional specimen
collections, and symptom assessment by telephone inter-
view would minimize the need for patient contact. The
study should be coordinated centrally and communication
between study sites should be by teleconference and email,
until risks are defined and minimized. Travel between cen-
ters would be limited by providing data collection forms
designed to be directly scanned and transmitted via the
Internet. This would reduce transmission risk and also
allow the participation of multiple international sites in a
single trial. Similar approaches have been effective in
other areas of clinical research and can also increase study
enrollment (18). 
Conclusions
Clinicians caring for patients with infectious disease
syndromes caused by unknown or novel pathogens are
under intense pressure to offer potentially efficacious ther-
apies. In future outbreaks, as in the SARS outbreak, thera-
peutic agents of unknown benefit will likely be used again.
These agents should be used in the setting of randomized
trials, to determine their efficacy and prevent therapies of
unknown efficacy (e.g., corticosteroids for SARS) from
becoming “standard of care” in the absence of good evi-
dence.
The unpredictable nature of outbreaks poses many
challenges to the successful design and implementation of
such trials. Creation of national or international collabora-
tive groups, with a mandate to implement clinical trials of
therapeutic agents in outbreak settings, and supported by
appropriate funding, may be the best strategy for achieving
this goal. The collaboration of ethics review boards in
establishing a process which facilitates trials while ensur-
ing the safety of participating patients, researchers, and
communities, is critical. 
After the SARS outbreak in 2003, thousands of patients
were treated with agents of unproven efficacy and definite
toxicity; data on these agents’ efficacy were not gathered.
To prevent this situation from repeating itself, we must be
prepared to conduct prospective, randomized controlled
trials in the event of future outbreaks of novel pathogens.
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